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Introduction 
Fifty years ago, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was 
created to serve as the nation’s expert on all issues environmental. The 
EPA’s 1970 authorizing charter delineates four roles for the new agency, 
two of which direct the fledgling agency to serve as the nation’s expert 
authority on environmental protection.1 
 
†  Richard Dale Endowed Chair of Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
I am grateful to the members of the Case Law Review for excellent 
editorial work and to participants at the Law Review's live symposium 
for helpful comments. This Article is based in part on a report I prepared 
for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), which 
formed the basis for the Administrative Conference Recommendation 
2013-3, Science in the Administrative Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,357 (July 
10, 2013). The views herein are mine alone and should not be attributed 
to the Conference, its staff, or its committees. For the full report, see 
Wendy Wagner, Science in Regulation: A Study of Agency 
Decisionmaking Approaches (2013), available at https://www.acus.gov/ 
 sites/default/files/documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20
Report_2_18_13_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TBA-WCJE]. 
1. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970), 
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at 202–07 (2006) (Two of the 
EPA’s four roles include: “[t]he conduct of research on the adverse effects 
of pollution and on methods and equipment for controlling it, the 
gathering of information on pollution, and the use of this information in 
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Because it is a core element of EPA’s mission,2 providing high 
quality expertise remains one of the legally established benchmarks 
against which we can judge the EPA’s success.3 While the demarcation 
of science from other ways of knowing is intrinsically fuzzy, 4 it seems 
uncontestable that, at the very least, agencies should make full and 
rigorous use of the scientific literature in informing policymaking.5 
Regulatory decisions are more effective and efficient when informed by 
the very best scientific and technical information. Moreover, if staffed 
with excellent professionals, agencies are well situated to provide 
rigorous, policy-relevant scientific information that is difficult to 
recreate at a grand scale in the private sector. Gillian Metzger argues 
that the Constitution may even require the administrative state to be 
staffed with “professional and expert government employ-
ees . . . insofar as such career staff are necessary to ensure expertise 
and institutional stability in agencies.”6  
 
strengthening environmental protection programs and recommending 
policy changes”; and “[a]ssisting others, through grants, technical 
assistance and other means in arresting pollution of the environment”). 
2. Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ 
 our-mission-and-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/MS29-YBH2] (last updated 
Feb. 7, 2018). 
3. Despite this clear mission statement, there remains significant skepticism 
within administrative circles regarding the viability of the expert model, 
although some of these concerns may result from a much broader 
definition of “expertise” than used in the article See infra text 
accompanying notes 11-12 ; see also Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the 
Administrative State: World War II and the Decline of Expert 
Administration, in Total War and the Law: The American Home 
Front in World War II 185, 191 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 
2002) (describing disillusionment with agency expertise); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Foreward: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 
131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 71–91 (2017).  
4. A vast literature in the philosophy and history of science explores what 
and whether there is actually anything unique embodied in scientific 
expertise itself. For the purposes of this Article, I bracket these important 
debates and assume that scientific expertise has qualities that distinguish 
it from other ways of knowing. See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, Why Trust 
Science? (2019). I also assume—purely for the purposes of argument—
that if the EPA’s role is in part to serve as a rigorous environmental 
expert, we should ensure as a legal and institutional matter that EPA has 
an opportunity to make progress on that front. 
5. The questions to be informed by this scientific guidance must be framed 
-- and continuously reviewed -- by society. Experts can provide 
empirically-based information, but great care must be taken to ensure this 
information is qualified and constantly checked for embedded value 
choices. See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science for 
Action in Law and Policy, 93 Texas L. Rev. 1723 (2015). 
6. Id. at 89–90. 
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Yet, over the last fifty years, the integrity of the EPA’s expertise 
has been under almost continuous attack. Industry, members of 
Congress, executive officials, public stakeholders, and all facets of the 
media have focused their criticisms—sometimes in unison—at the 
EPA’s use of “bad science” and its failure as the nation’s environmental 
expert.7  
In this Article, I take a close look behind the media coverage and 
legal challenges to locate some stunning innovations in the EPA’s 
ability to provide quality scientific advice.8 On the Agency’s fiftieth 
anniversary, I spotlight these expert accomplishments, which occur 
despite considerable political pressure and public controversy. The EPA 
in these cases has not only fulfilled its mission as a nation's expert, but 
it has pioneered models for other agencies with regard to how to provide 
this essential, but hotly contested science advice. 
Of course, the EPA is not a monolith, and some of its expert work 
has, from time to time, rightly sparked public condemnation.9 Indeed, 
even the accomplishments discussed here are full of fits and starts. But 
extracting some of the EPA’s successes in providing expertise tells us 
something— perhaps a lot—about expert agencies; it also offers 
valuable lessons for the future. The Trump Administration’s targeted, 
and thus far still only partial, efforts to dismantle some of the EPA’s 
expert-based programs only further underscore the important role of 
 
7. These charges are widespread and these citations provide only an 
illustrative sampling. See, e.g., David Hasemyer, Rep. Lamar Smith 
Launches New Assault on EPA’s “Secret Science”, Inside Climate 
News, (Feb. 2, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/02022017/ 
 lamar-smith-epa-house-science-committee [https://perma.cc/R9QX-PHXP] 
(describing new legislation that aims to increase transparency regarding 
the science that the EPA administrator relies upon to regulate); David 
Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty: Contested 
Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment, 95 
Am. J. Pub. Health S39, S41–43 (2005) (providing examples of 
industry’s strategy of contesting the quality of the agency’s science); Junk 
Science, https://junkscience.com/ [https://perma.cc/KD8K-843C] 
(describing “junk sceince” predominately related to the EPA) (last visited 
June 6, 2020). 
8. The innovations highlighted here were identified in a study I prepared as 
a consultant for ACUS. See Wendy Wagner, Science in Regulation: 
A Study of Agency Decisionmaking Approaches 29–39 (2013) 
(analyzing the integration of science into the EPA’s regulatory program), 
available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Science% 
 20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 4TBA-WCJE]. 
9. The tragedy in Flint is one of the most troubling failures in the EPA’s 
expert dossier. See, e.g., Anna Clark, The Poisoned City: Flint’s 
Water and the American Urban Tragedy 6 (2018) (describing how 
the federal government contributed to the health crises arising from the 
lead in Flint’s water). 
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credible, scientific expertise, as well as the remarkable resiliency of the 
EPA, even in response to wholesale executive attack.10 
In discussing this expert role for the EPA, it is nonetheless 
important to be crystal clear about what is and is not meant by 
“bureaucratic expertise.” The expert role of the EPA explored here 
concerns only the Agency’s capacity to provide rigorous scientific 
information and advice. It does not include the ability of agency experts 
to select the best regulatory standard or outcome. In the literature, 
these two very different roles are sometimes conflated: an “agency 
expert” is portrayed as one that chooses a preferred policy, as well as 
conducts the underlying analysis.11 That is emphatically not the scope 
of the expert role considered in this Article. Instead, the focus is simply 
on the first, advisory step: is the agency able to provide rigorous expert 
analyses to the nation or is even this advice-giving role undermined by 
existing administrative procedures?12 
This Article’s celebration of the EPA’s periodic success as an expert 
bureaucrat begins in Part I by reconstructing the institutional 
architecture within which expert agencies must operate. While on the 
one hand, a significant role for the EPA is tied to the Agency’s ability 
to provide rigorous scientific expertise to inform policy; on the other, 
we have placed a number of legal constraints on the EPA’s ability to 
carry out this goal. Rather than constructing an executive branch that 
nurtures and encourages excellent expert analysis by agencies, there are 
key architectural features of administrative process that make it 
 
10. See, e.g., Brad Plumer & Coral Davenport, Science Under Attack: How 
Trump is Sidelining Researchers and their Work, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/climate/trump-administration-
war-on-science.html [https://perma.cc/S5UQ-X8NC] (highlighting recent 
policy changes that curtail using scientific expertise in the EPA’s 
regulation process). Among the more significant (of many) assaults is a 
proposed rule that allows political appointees to sidestep scientific staff’s 
judgment in conducting a review of the relevant research, the overt 
stacking of external science advisory panels, and the reconfiguration of 
lines of authority within the Agency to afford the scientific units less 
independence—all of which provide evidence of the impediments that 
agency expertise poses to a President eager to control the entire 
bureaucracy. See, e.g., Thomas McGarity & Wendy Wagner, Deregulation 
Using Stealth Science Strategies, 68 Duke L.J. 1719, 1724–34 (2019). 
11. My analysis thus investigates a different issue than the one fronted by 
several others writing on administrative expertise. See, e.g., Kathryn A. 
Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 706–26 
(2016) (discussing politics and expertise as essentially mutually exclusive, 
and focusing primarily on the role of experts in making policy decisions); 
Shannon Roesler, Agency Reasons at the Intersection of Expertise and 
Presidential Preferences, 71 Admin. L. Rev. 491, 521–24, 526–27 (2019). 
12. Through this framing, important yet contested issues are bracketed, such 
as when or whether the President can, as a legal matter, control agency 
decisions and set aside expert advice in statutory settings where the 
mandate weighs scientific expertise heavily as a determining factor. 
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difficult, and sometimes impossible, for agencies to deliver this 
much-needed expert advice. Part II then considers the EPA’s ability to 
rise above these institutional impediments at various points in its fifty-
year history and nevertheless provide rigorous scientific expertise in 
spite of the less-than-ideal legal structure for doing so. Part III closes 
with some thoughts for the future of expert agencies. 
I.  A Hostile Institutional Environment for Agency 
Expertise 
The scientific research that informs policy is a natural target for 
political and stakeholder pressure when the findings are inconvenient. 
Accounts of ends-oriented manipulations of policy-relevant science are 
legendary.13 It should thus come as no surprise that a great deal of 
scholarly and governmental effort has been dedicated to devising ways 
to protect applied scientific research and analyses from this type of 
biasing. Science journals in particular have devised various methods to 
help protect the integrity of research from external influence.14 These 
methods benchmark the rigor of a scientific study or analysis in part 
by how well the researcher is afforded autonomy and is able to approach 
the research in a skeptical, open-minded way.15 Science journals, for 
example, insist on full disclosures of conflicts of interest, as well as 
 
13. See, e.g., David Michaels, Doubt is Their Product: How 
Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your Health (2008) 
(documenting how product-defense consultants have skewed science and 
used what sounds like science to advantage polluters and manufacturers 
of dangerous products); David Michaels, The Triumph of Doubt 
(2020); Naomi Oreskes & Eric M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: 
How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from 
Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (2009) (recounting the 
“Tobacco Strategy” and how it attacked science and scientists to confuse 
the public about major issues affecting the planet and peoples’ lives); 
Thomas McGarity & Wendy Wagner, Bending Science (2007) 
(arguing that scientific institutions of public-health and environmental 
research are under attack in ways that neither the legal nor the scientific 
community can acknowledge or combat). 
14. Heavy reputational sanctions also befall scientists who conduct fraudulent 
or unreliable research in order to advance their own interests or personal 
agenda. See, e.g., Donald Kennedy, Responding to Fraud, 314 Science 
1353, 1353 (2006) (describing how falsified science reports were retracted 
from publication and outlining various means that the magazine can use 
to combat false science in the future). 
15. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of Med. J. Editors, Recommendations for 
the Conduct, Reporting, Editing, and Publication of Scholarly 
Work in Medical Journals 1–3 (2019) (describing ways that a 
researcher can author accurate, clear, reproducible, and unbiased medical 
journal articles—particularly through full disclosure of financial interests 
and potential conflicts of interest). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020 
It isn’t Easy Being a Bureaucratic Expert 
1098 
certifications of authorship that include assurances that the author 
enjoyed full control over all aspects of the research.16 
In designing expert bureaucracies, this same “independence” has 
become a central structural theme as well. In a series of recent reports, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
reiterates independence from political and stakeholder control as the 
most important institutional design feature to advance agency 
expertise. 17  The essential role of agency autonomy has also been 
spotlighted by other commenters as a central design principle for 
administrative design. 18  Indeed, without some agency autonomy in 
conducting the foundational scientific analyses that inform policy (such 
as a literature review, for instance), there will be no limit to the 
invisible, ends-oriented tinkering that could occur to bias the analyses.19 
This is especially true if there is no record of these sources of influence. 
But administrative processes that govern agency expertise in the 
United States move in precisely the opposite direction from these best 
practices. Several key institutional features may, in fact, prove 
antithetical to nurturing and protecting expert advice within our 
agencies. These features are not ephemeral or “Trumpian,” but have 
become hard-wired into the structure of how we design administrative 
 
16. See, e.g., Bennett Holman & Kevin Elliott, The Promise and Perils of 
Industry-Funded Science, 13 Phil. Compass 1 (2018) (describing the 
advantages and disadvantages of disclosing private funding for scientific 
research and potential avenues for progress); Marcus R. Munafo et al., A 
Manifesto for Reproducible Science, 1 Nature Hum. Behav. 1, 1–3 
(2017) (arguing for the greater adoption of key measures that can ensure 
scientific robustness, particularly through disclosing conflicts of interest). 
17. See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. (OECD), The 
Governance of Regulators Governance of Regulators’ 
Practices: Accountability, Transparency and Co-ordination 
(2016) (describing how accountability and transparency can be achieved 
through informal and formal measures but independence from legislators 
and the executive must be achieved), available at https://www.oecd.org/ 
 publications/governance-of-regulators-practices-9789264255388-en.htm; 
OECD, Being an Independent Regulator (2016), (researching how 
to best develop an independent regulatory framework with accountability 
and transparency), available at https://www.oecd.org/publications/ 
 being-an-independent-regulator-9789264255401-en.htm. 
18. See, e.g., 1 Nat’l Task Force on Rule of Law & Democracy, 
Proposals For Reform 18 (2018) (discussing the importance of 
“limited contacts” policies that bar communications between the White 
House and enforcement personnel on specific cases); Cary Coglianese, The 
Semi-Autonomous Administrative State, Reg. Rev. (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/07/coglianese-semi-autonomous-
administrative-state/ [https://perma.cc/2WVW-XCP5] (describing how 
all agencies need some requisite neutral expertise). 
19. See, e.g., McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13, at 60–61 (describing 
how sponsors shape scientific research at different stages and explaining 
why scientists may conform to this method). 
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processes. Despite the centrality of expertise to bureaucracy and public 
administration, then, the administrative state’s architecture presents a 
series of impediments to this goal of autonomous expertise. 
A. Agencies Are Subjected to Political, Top-Down Direction. 
Political appointees within the agencies and sometimes in the White 
House have long enjoyed control over all aspects of their agency’s work, 
including its scientific analyses. 20  In some agencies, the very first 
science-intensive report that is made public is jointly offered between 
the scientific staff and political officials.21 In other cases, even if a 
political appointee delegates authority to the technical staff and is not 
engaged in the analytical work, it is technically his or her prerogative 
to intervene and hold up, and, in some cases alter, that technical 
analysis if he or she so chooses.22 
Moreover, if there are internal disagreements between the scientific 
staff and the policy officials, the fact of these disagreements—not to 
mention their merits and ultimate resolution—are routinely classified 
as deliberative process and protected from public disclosure under the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).23 In these internal government 
 
20. See, e.g., 2 Nat’l Task Force on Rule of Law & Democracy, 
Proposals for Reform 1–3 (2019) (proposing multiple ways to prevent 
the politicization of scientific research and regulatory frameworks within 
agencies); McGarity & Wagner, supra note 10, at 1721, 1723–24 
(describing how an administrator can influence the research relied upon 
to pass regulations); Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: 
Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2019, 2032–45 (2015) (describing how the White House—
particularly through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA)—can influence agencies’ policies). 
21. See, e.g., Jori Reilly-Diakun, Addressing Blurred Lines: Institutional 
Design Solutions to Transgressions Across the Science-Policy Boundary, 
49 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 199, 218–20 (2019) (describing a “laissez-faire” 
review process whereby experts and policymakers collaborate to pass 
policies); Wagner, supra note 8, at 61–62 (discussing such a report, 
listing endangered species, issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service). 
22. See Heidi Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White 
House Administration, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2395, 2411 (2011); see also 
supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
23. Although it was initially a common-law creation, the deliberative-process 
privilege is most commonly invoked as an exemption to the Freedom of 
Information Act, allowing an agency to withhold “inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letter which would not be available by law to a 
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(5) (2012); see also Shilpa Narayan, Proper Assertion of the 
Deliberative Process Privilege: The Agency Head Requirement, 77 
Fordham L. Rev. 1183, 1187–1193 (describing the history and 
development of the deliberative-process privilege).  
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discussions, outsiders cannot trace the role that politics might play in 
an analysis that is presented as technical in nature.24 
It may seem initially disconcerting to allow for this type of top-
down, nontransparent, political control over all aspects of an agency’s 
work, but the overarching logic is sound. 25  Since aspects of these 
technical analyses almost always involve some modicum of policy 
discretion—and since an agency must speak with one voice and ensure 
the scientific integrity of its analyses—individual staff should not be 
allowed to operate with complete independence.26 Misleading technical 
information could surface in the public sphere before it has been 
adequately vetted. Rogue agency staff would accordingly enjoy too 
much power and might confuse and terrify the public. Official agency 
clearance is thus needed at some level to ensure the integrity of that 
agency’s work. 
When carried too far, however, this institutional design can allow 
for political manipulation of the scientific record in ways that escape 
detection.27 Indeed even Justice Kagan, who is considered a proponent 
of presidential control, has urged limits on White House control over 
an agency’s scientific work:28 
[T]here is no good reason for a President to displace or ignore 
purely scientific determinations—as to the kinds of questions, say, 
on which Congress often instructs agencies to seek opinions from 
outside advisory committees. The exercise of presidential power 
in this context would threaten a kind of impartiality and 
objectivity in decisionmaking that conduces to both the 
effectiveness and the legitimacy of the administrative process.29 
Yet, in administrative law, it is well known that if a technical 
analysis presents inconvenient results, a political official can and 
sometimes does make adjustments to the technical record, all under the 
 
24. See generally Wagner, supra note 8 (discussing examples of the 
deliberative-process privilege in various science-intensive reviews). 
25. See generally Watts, supra note 11 (giving examples of presidential control 
over aspects of agency); Roesler, supra note 11 (same). 
26. See generally Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in 
Environmental Policy, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1601 (2008) (identifying some of 
the dangers of providing staff too much authority). See also Reilly-
Diakun, supra note 21, at 213–15. 
27. See, e.g., 2 Nat’l Task Force on Rule of Law & Democracy, supra 
note 20; McGarity & Wagner, supra note 10; Wagner, supra note 20. 
28. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 
2356–57 (2001) (urging self-restraint in the White House’s reviewing 
agencies’ science-intensive rules); cf. Watts, supra note 11, at 728–30 
(describing a broader position on presidential control than Kagan, 
including over agency expertise). 
29. Kagan, supra note 28, at 2356–57. 
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cover of executive discretion.30 Unless the agency has in place strong 
internal processes that prevent these types of interventions into the 
technical analyses, 31  there is no limit. Moreover, without internal 
process and disclosure requirements, it becomes impossible for those 
outside the agency to judge the integrity and independence of technical 
analyses that inform the agency’s decisions since political officials enjoy 
an invisible, yet sometimes decisive role in adjusting that work. 
It is thus not surprising to learn that, over the decades, political 
officials have taken advantage of this power when scientific analyses 
blocked their preferred policies.32 Most of these political intrusions into 
the scientific record surfaced from individual-agency whistleblowing or 
anonymous reports of political meddling.33 Given the high personal 
stakes involved in whistleblowing, however, it seems likely that political 
manipulation of agency scientific analyses may be much more frequent 
than the publicized accounts suggest.34 
But more important for understanding the scientific integrity of the 
agency’s expertise, this institutional design places, by necessity, agency 
scientific staff in a position of subservience to policymakers. The staff’s 
professional independence in analyzing the scientific record is only as 
strong as the internal agency processes that limit political 
interventions.35 And, while an agency’s scientific-integrity policies help 
to protect the work of staff scientists, these policies remain both 
incomplete and effectively unenforceable. 36  Regardless of what an 
agency scientist understands when she enters the federal workforce, if 
and when there is an internal conflict over what the evidence suggests 
for policy, the scientific staffer’s analysis may play a secondary role and 
may ultimately be adjusted to better fit the preferred policy. This 
resolution, moreover, may occur without any public record of the 
 
30. See supra notes 11 and 20. 
31. See infra Part II.  
32. See supra notes 10 and 20. 
33. See supra notes 10 and 20. 
34. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 26, at 1641–42. 
35. President Obama recognized this problem, but did not solve it. See, e.g., 
Wagner, supra note 20, at 2029, 2036–45; see also Lisa Heinzerling, Inside 
EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the 
Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 325, 
361–65 (2014) (discussing the nontransparent nature of OIRA review). 
36. Agency science-integrity policies are useful in providing a process for 
preventing this type of manipulation, at least facially. As the commentary 
observes, however, the policies at this point appear to be primarily 
symbolic. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, President Trump’s War on Regulatory 
Science, 43 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 247, 288 (2019); McGarity & Wagner, 
supra note 10, at 1775–78 (discussing the literature on these policies). 
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respective roles an agency’s scientists and political officials played in 
the final, public decision.37 
B. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking and Judicial Review Can Further 
Undermine an Agency’s Incentives for Producing Scientifically Grounded 
Rules. 
A second feature of administrative law, in theory, should help 
correct these political manipulations of the scientific record: notice-and-
comment rule-making and judicial review. 38  The Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) invites any affected party to submit comments 
on an agency’s proposed rule (including the analyses that informs them) 
and to later sue the agency if a comment is ignored in ways that are 
“arbitrary and capricious.”39 This bottom-up, democratic role of notice-
and-comment provides some outer bounds on abuses of administrative 
discretion with respect to both the competence of the staff analysis, as 
well as the political manipulation of that analysis. And some courts 
have been quite comfortable remanding agency rules in cases where they 
identify irregularities in the supporting technical record.40 
But this check on political, ends-oriented tinkering with the 
scientific record proves incomplete for several reasons. First, if the 
political manipulations are done well, they will be difficult to locate.41 
One would need to replicate the agency’s analysis from beginning-to-
end, scrutinize each assumption (or incomplete explanation), and even 
conduct an independent literature search to locate excluded studies.42 
This process is extremely time-intensive. As a result, unless a 
stakeholder has ample resources, locating ends-oriented adjustments to 
an agency’s scientific analysis could be difficult, if not impossible.43 
 
37. See supra notes 24–24 and accompanying text. 
38. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
39. Id. § 706. 
40. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and 
Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 
733, 738, 778–79 (2011) (extolling the benefits of the judiciary’s insistence 
on reason-giving as applied to agencies’ science-intensive rules). 
41. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13, at 60–96; McGarity & 
Wagner, supra note 10, at 1724–69. 
42. The same concerns attend to external biasing of scientific research in 
academia and in the private sector; this is why scientific journals require 
as prerequisites to publication the comprehensive disclosure of conflicts of 
interest, sponsor control, and authorship. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of Med. 
J. Editors, supra note 15. 
43. Indeed, even if the resources were available, some of the relevant 
information needed to recreate the agency’s analysis may be unavailable. 
In the case of pesticides, for example, the unpublished industry studies 
are not, as a matter of law, allowed to be made publicly available except 
in very narrow circumstances. See 7 U.S.C. § 136h(g)(1) (2012). 
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There is also limited time available to do this work. If concerned 
stakeholders do not file comments raising their technical concerns 
during the allotted notice-and-comment period, they waive the right to 
challenge the rule later through litigation.44 
Second, it remains unclear whether the (remote) risk of getting 
sued—and losing—is consequential enough to inhibit political 
manipulations of an agency’s supporting technical analysis. At least in 
one case, where we know that White House officials did in fact alter an 
agency’s scientific record, the court studiously avoided noting that fact 
in its remand back to the agency.45 According to the court, fault lay 
with the agency, not the chief executive responsible for making the 
change.46 Thus, political officials seem to be off the hook, at least 
publicly, for the bad publicity that can follow these ends-oriented 
manipulations. In any event, if the political stakes are high enough, it 
is not clear that worries about judicial reversals will provide much 
deterrence.47 Particularly if the political goal is to promulgate a less-
stringent rule that protects industry, the delay generated by litigation 
may still be economically beneficial to industry since it postpones the 
applicable regulatory requirements.48 And, more cynically, even if the 
court blocks the ability of a political official to deliver regulatory relief 
to a favored constituent, the political official can blame the court and 
still get credit for trying. 
The potential impotency of the APA’s capacity for counteracting 
incentives for political manipulation of technical analyses is 
disappointing, but the role of the APA in protecting agency expertise 
turns out to be even more perverse. Since it is costly to participate in 
notice-and-comment on technical rules, 49  research shows that, in 
practice, only industry groups may be able to afford to participate in 
 
44. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) (setting out the reasons 
for first exhausting remedies within the Agency before raising the issue 
with the court); Wendy Wagner, Incomprehensible!: A Study of 
How Our Legal System Encourages Incomprehensibility, Why It 
Matters, and What We Can Do About It 184–86 (2019). 
45. Wagner, supra note 20, at 2039 n.88. 
46. Id. 
47. See, e.g., Nick Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: 
Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 Harv. 
L. Rev. 685 (2018); Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial 
Review on Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 53 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1717, 1760–66 (2012). 
48. Wagner, supra note 20, at 1774 n.245 (citing the literature concluding 
that delays resulting from remands generally benefit industry positions). 
49. Id. 
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many of them.50 This, in turn, means that only industry groups will be 
exerting pressure on the quality of the agency’s scientific analysis. 
One-sided input and review of expert analyses is facially worrisome 
because even an agency’s best experts might develop blind spots if their 
work is not reviewed by a diverse group of skeptics. 51  But in 
administrative process, there are several added features that may 
further compromise the scientific independence and rigor of the agency's 
technical analysis for a subset of rules. First, some of the agency's 
analyses may attract a flood of one-sided (and not necessarily reliable 
or relevant) information during the notice-and-comment process that 
drains the technical staff’s analytical resources and may even 
compromise the staff’s ability to view the evidence in a balanced way.52 
Under administrative law, it is an agency’s responsibility to process and 
sort through all stakeholder input, no matter how abundant, unhelpful, 
 
50. Specifically, in a number of empirical studies of environmental and public 
health rulemakings, in roughly half the rules promulgated by the EPA 
(and other agencies), only industry groups are participating in notice and 
comment (and hence in judicial review). See Maureen L. Cropper et al., 
The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA 
Decision Making, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 175, 178, 187 (1992) (examining 
pesticide registrations between 1975 and 1989 and finding that 
environmentalists participated in 49% of the cancellations); Marissa 
Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who 
Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & 
Theory 245, 253–54 (1998) (studying eight rules promulgated by the 
EPA and the NHTSA, and determining via content analysis who 
participates and influences federal regulations and finding no citizen 
engagement in five of the eight rules); see also Jason W. Yackee & Susan 
W. Yackee, A Bias toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence 
on the Bureaucracy, 68 J. Pol. 128, 131, 133 (2006) (studying forty lower-
salience rulemakings promulgated by four different federal agencies and 
finding that business interests submitted 57% of comments; whereas 
nonbusiness or nongovernmental organizations submitted 22% of 
comments, 6% of which came from public interest groups); Wendy 
Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s 
Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 99, 128 (2011) 
(discovering that public interest groups participated in notice and 
comment for less than half (48%) of the rules setting emission standards 
for hazardous air pollutants from major categories of industry); Cary 
Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the 
Administrative Process 73 tbl.2-2 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Michigan) (finding that businesses participated in 96% of 
rules and that national environmental groups participated in 44%), 
available at https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/129432 
[https://perma.cc/RC5J-ML47]. 
51. See, e.g., Hellen E. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: 
Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry 80 (1990) 
(underscoring the role of critical and diverse scrutiny in science). 
52. Id. 
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or unreliable.53 Regulated industries, which often have very high stakes 
in advancing their positions, may take full advantage of this 
opportunity to monopolize an agency’s attention. 
Exacerbating the skewed, information-input problem is the 
selective, technical “peer” review that occurs as a result of a one-sided 
notice-and-comment process. In the majority of rules in which industry 
groups are the sole participants, the primary and possibly the only 
public scrutiny to an agency’s analyses comes from the regulated 
sector. 54  Moreover, under administrative law, there is no adverse 
consequence for commenters who provide ends-oriented technical 
comments or even scientifically misleading or dishonest comments.55 
Again, it is the agency’s job to process all of the scientific criticism, no 
matter how misdirected or factually inaccurate.56 
Further magnifying the influence of industry-dominated comments 
on the agency's analysis is the fact that the risk of subsequent legal 
challenges will come largely, if not exclusively, from this same sector.57 
Under the courts' interpretation of the APA, an agency cannot be sued 
unless the litigant's concern was raised with specificity during the 
comment period.58 If the critical comment was not entered into the 
record, then the agency need not anticipate or second guess that 
concern. Groups who are absent from the notice-and-comment process 
will thus be foreclosed from litigating an agency’s decision—for example 
one that defers uncritically to the industry’s analysis—unless there is 
offsetting information somewhere else in the administrative record.59 
Yet there is one last perverse incentive that can emerge from the 
notice-and-comment process that could further undercut the integrity 
of an agency’s independent technical analysis. According to the courts’ 
“logical outgrowth” test, if an agency alters its analysis or rule in 
significant ways as a result of the comments received, it must start the 
 
53. Wagner, supra note 44, at 186–87. 
54. As discussed below in Part II, the use of external scientific peer review 
could help buffer the agency’s analysis against this one-sided assault. But 
currently, scientific peer review is not a process that is codified, much less 
specified in detail, within administrative process. Instead, peer review 
remains malleable in its implementation and, in the worst case, can and 
has been used by political officials in ends-oriented ways. See infra notes 
70–75 and accompanying text. 
55. Wagner, supra note 44, at 184. 
56. Id. 
57. See generally Gabriel H. Markoff, The Invisible Barrier: Issue Exhaustion 
as a Threat to Pluralism in Administrative Rulemaking, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 
1065 (2012). 
58. Id. at 1078. 
59. Id. at 1084–85. 
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notice-and-comment process over.60 This test—at least at the EPA—
sometimes motivates an agency to attempt to pre-emptively negotiate 
the proposed rule with high-stakes regulated parties.61 Although there 
is no clear evidence that in these negotiations the technical analyses are 
compromised or adjusted in ways that are not balanced, this risk seems 
at least possible. To avoid having a rule caught up in decades of legal 
challenges, the safest course for an agency is to reach some consensus 
before the rule goes through the APA’s notice-and-comment process. 
As one EPA staff member remarked with respect to industry 
participants, “[w]e help them; they help us.”62 
Cumulatively, each of these APA-generated incentives to drift from 
what might initially involve a more straight-lined, objective analysis of 
the scientific record occurs not despite administrative law, but because 
of it. Of course, this is not always the case. If the interest-group 
pressures are adversarial and somewhat balanced, an agency may be 
more inclined to hew to the most neutral interpretation of the record 
since opponents will catch and challenge deviations. 63  But when 
opponents are missing from the rulemaking process, and the machine-
gun fire comes only from regulated industry, an agency may find it 
necessary to deviate from a straight-and-narrow interpretation of the 
applicable science. 
 
60. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750–51 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
61. See, e.g., William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, 
Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An 
Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 Pub. Admin. Rev. 66, 74 (2004); see 
also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 1255, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (“I agree that the negotiated programs without rulemaking cannot 
be sanctioned under TSCA, though negotiation [solely with industry] to 
determine appropriate test protocols as well as other relevant criteria 
certainly is not only permissible but indeed preferable to blind, often 
impractical, bureaucratic blundering”). 
62. Coglianese, supra note 50, at 14. 
63. See infra Part II. It is important to reiterate that in other rule settings 
where all affected groups and their experts are pouring over the agency’s 
analysis, the administrative process appears to markedly improve the 
quality of the agency’s expert analysis by forcing out more explicit 
reasoning and balanced considerations. William T. Gormley, Jr., 
Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 Polity 595, 607–08 
(1986). Indeed, it is from this “adversarial” quadrant that the success 
stories in the EPA’s expert analyses in the NAAQS process are drawn. 
See infra Part II. Thus it is possible that the administrative process exerts 
a bipolar set of incentives on the agency for excellent expertise. In cases 
where the stakeholders are diverse, the incentives are positive; in settings 
where the stakeholders are aggressive and monolithic, the incentives can 
be perverse. Since the focus here is on the systematic protection of agency 
expertise, the negative impacts of the APA on this expertise are of 
primary interest. 
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C. Staffing the Expert Bureaucracy Is also Subject to Political Control 
An agency’s expertise is only as good as the quality of its scientific 
staff.64 But the management, hiring, and firing of technical staff is in 
control of political appointees and their staff, who sometimes make 
these decisions in a political, ends-oriented fashion.65 
Although there are obvious justifications for political control over 
the management of an agency’s technical staff such as the EPA, the 
implications of complete control are problematic in ensuring rigorous, 
independent expert staff. 66  A political administrator eager to gain 
control over her agency’s scientific decisions need only look to budgets, 
retention policies, and organizational charts to gut the agency’s 
independent expertise. As Gillian Metzger observes, “from the 
proposition that delegated power must be faithfully executed, . . . 
massively underfunding the EPA without altering its statutory 
responsibilities or repealing environmental rules . . . begin[s] to look 
constitutionally suspect.”67 
Not surprisingly, when Presidents have been hostile to the 
independent judgments of agency experts that could impede their 
preferred policies, those agencies’ political officials have in fact used 
budgets and hiring and retention policies to exert some indirect control 
over the technical staff.68 Moreover, when deployed in ends-oriented 
ways, these techniques appear to be at least partly effective in 
controlling the scientific advice that the technical staff can offer on 
various regulatory issues.69 
Political control over the staffing of an agency’s experts does not 
stop with its own full-time employees, but such control also extends to 
the creation and composition of science advisory boards assembled to 
peer review the agency’s technical analysis. 70  In principle, these 
scientific advisory boards must be “balanced,”71 and there is a cultural 
norm that they also be staffed with respected, mainstream scientists 
 
64. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
65. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Mother Earth and Uncle Sam: How 
Pollution and Hollow Government Hurt Our Kids 50–53 (2008) 
(describing this problem at the EPA); see also McGarity & Wagner, supra 
note 10, at 1747–56; Plumer & Davenport, supra note 10. 
66. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (stressing the need for 
independent control over hiring and budget). 
67. Metzger, supra note 3, at 90. 
68. See supra note 63. 
69. Id. 
70. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and Federal Advisory 
Committees, 350 New Eng. J. Med. 1454, 1456 (2004) (criticizing the 
George W. Bush administration for stacking science advisory committees). 
71. Id. at 1457.  
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who will provide somewhat representative views of the diverse scientific 
community.72 Yet in practice, there is no legal prohibition against the 
overt stacking of the boards for the purpose of achieving an agency’s 
political, rather than scientific, goals.73 In many settings, the boards 
also are funded by and engage only at the whim of the political 
administrator.74 So, if the scientific advisory boards cannot be stacked 
easily with biased members, they can be discontinued instead.75 The 
political control of science advisors is a complex topic, but whatever the 
ultimate conclusions, there can be no question that this political control 
is also well positioned to compromise the independence and objectivity 
of the technical assessments emerging from agencies. 
II. Expert Innovations at the EPA 
Although the EPA was created in part to serve as the nation’s 
environmental expert, it has not been given the needed institutional 
support for that assignment. Instead, existing legal controls tend to 
undermine the Agency’s ability to provide independent, objective 
advice and technical analyses on environmental issues. 
Yet even with the institutional odds stacked against it, the EPA 
has sometimes (though certainly not always) emerged as a formidable 
expert.76 In this section, I detail some of the innovations the EPA has 
introduced through the National Ambient Air Quality Standard 
(NAAQS) program to provide needed expertise, while insulating that 
expertise as much as possible from excessive political and stakeholder 
influence.77 These internal processes may even fall into the category of 
 
72. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. at 492–93 (2012). 
73. See, e.g., Steinbrook, supra note 70, at 1459; cf. Brian D. Feinstein 
& Daniel J. Hemel, Outside Advisers Inside Agencies, 108 Geo. L.J. 1139 
(2020) (noting the political valence of advisory boards and arguing, 
normatively, that it is a positive development because it increases political 
control over agency decisions). 
74. See, e.g., McGarity & Wagner, supra note 10, at 1763–65.  
75. Id. 
76. Because there is little work done in attempting to root through the deep 
recesses of agency decisions to assess in a grounded way some practices in 
how agencies use science, I was fortunate enough to be commissioned by 
ACUS to do exactly that. In the course of a study of three agencies and 
nearly a half-dozen discrete regulatory programs, I—largely by chance—
stumbled upon some exciting procedures that the EPA (particularly in 
the NAAQS program) instituted to provide high-quality expert analysis 
on the existing literature, while remaining attentive to the inevitable 
discretion it sometimes requires that involve policy choices. 
77. This part draws heavily from Wagner, supra note 8. 
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“internal law” defined by Kevin Stack and Gillian Metzger since they 
structure the Agency’s internal decision process in significant ways. 78 
Before delving into the details, there are two important lessons to 
spotlight at the outset arising from this grounded study of the NAAQS 
innovations. The first—which appears to run against the conventional 
wisdom79—is that, practically, science and policy can be separated in 
ways that help to enhance the accountability of both.80 In its famous 
Red Book, the National Academies of Science underscores the critical 
import of separating the technical assessment from the political 
decision-making as an institutional matter,81 even though that report is 
often cited (incorrectly) for the opposite proposition.82 Bifurcating these 
steps is based on the very real concern that until the expert 
contributions are isolated and made transparent, there is no assurance 
that high-quality scientific analysis has occurred within the agency. The 
agency staff’s technical analysis must still incorporate non-scientific 
assumptions and judgments to fill in the many uncertainties and gaps 
in science. Yet by clearly identifying and explaining these assumptions 
in the course of the analysis, the experts are able to avoid over-reaching 
with hidden policy choices. Clear explication of the limits of the 
scientific research by the experts thus helps sharpen the “blurred” lines 
between science and policy.83 
A second lesson is that the best way to understand the role of 
agency experts is to conduct in-depth studies of what is actually 
occurring within the agencies as science moves through these regulatory 
processes.84 Agencies have been engaged in trial-and-error with respect 
 
78. Gillian E. Metzer & Kevin Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1239, 1244 (2017). 
79. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 10, at 728–30; Roesler, supra note 10, at 526. 
80. See, e.g., McGarity & Wagner, supra note 9, at 1787–89 (citing the 
literature); Reilly-Diakun, supra note 20, at 220–25. 
81. Comm. On The Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to 
Pub. Health, Nat’l Res. Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing The Process 2–3, 148 (1983). 
82. Id. at 148. 
83. See, e.g., Reilly-Diakun, supra note 21, at 221–22. Susan Dudley and 
Marcus Peacock, for example, raise concerns about expert staff over-
reaching by making policy-based assumptions to fill the many gaps in 
information. Susan E. Dudley & Marcus Peacock, Improving Regulatory 
Science: A Case Study of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 24 
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 49 (2016). Yet these author’s solutions involve 
advocating greater explication of these assumptions, rather than the 
wholesale elimination of expertise. See id. 
84. By contrast, efforts to re-create underlying black-boxed agency processes 
by extracting a few snapshots from decided court cases risks is likely to 
offer an incomplete understanding, at best, of an agency’s use of science. 
The litigation of agency rules is not random but selective, and thus this 
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to providing scientific advice for over half a century.85 There is thus a 
great deal of experience to be mined that will not only provide useful 
institutional-design lessons, but will offer insights to our theoretical 
understanding of regulatory science. 
With these two general lessons out of the way, we can now examine 
several of the EPA’s innovations in bureaucratic expertise offered by 
the NAAQS process. Under the Clean Air Act,86 the EPA is required to 
set national ambient air-quality standards (the NAAQS) for a few, 
pervasive air pollutants in order to “protect the public health” with “an 
adequate margin of safety.” 87  While this standard-setting task has 
substantial social implications, Congress grounds the exercise heavily 
in scientific research.88 To keep up with the latest science, the EPA is 
statutorily required to review each NAAQS every five years.89 
The resulting ambient-pollution standards are not simply 
aspirational, but mandatory; all parts of the country must be in 
compliance with these standards or face costly consequences.90 As a 
result of their national importance, political and public interest in these 
science-intensive standards is generally high,91 at least as compared to 
the EPA’s other science-intensive decisions. On the public-health side, 
national standards that are set proactively can save thousands of lives 
and tens of millions of dollars annually in health impacts since air 
pollution is still a major culprit in causing a variety of health ailments, 
 
litigation is unlikely to be representative of the larger universe of agency 
expertise in rulemakings. See, e.g., McGarity & Wagner, supra note 10, 
at 1745–49 (noting that in the EPA’s air toxic program only 8% of the 
rules were challenged, and in all but one of these cases, the public-interest 
groups brought suit). Additionally, and still more problematic, because 
the Department of Justice represents the Agency in court, the litigation 
will offer a “cleared” government explanation of the underlying agency 
expert processes which may be misleading and self-serving. For this and 
other reasons, using litigation as the primary empirical probe into 
understanding agency behavior needs to be used carefully and with 
multiple caveats. 
85. Id. 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).  
87. Id. § 7409(b)(1). 
88. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 464–65 (2001). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (2012). 
90. See, e.g., id. § 7506(c). 
91. See, e.g., Jason West & Yang Oi, Air Pollution: How Smarter Policy 
Could Lead to Cleaner Air, Nat’l Interest (Feb. 23, 2020), 
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/air-pollution-how-smarter-policy-
could-lead-cleaner-air-125936 [https://perma.cc/L833-VCHW]. 
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not to mention agricultural and environmental damage. 92  On the 
industry side, every increment downwards in setting protective NAAQS 
raises the costs—sometimes exponentially—of compliance.93 Regulated 
parties (e.g., coal and gas industries) facing the highest compliance costs 
will be eager to ensure that the NAAQS are set as permissively as 
possible. What is more, entire transportation systems, the ability to 
rely on coal for energy, and a host of other major economic decisions 
are directly impacted by the selection of these quantitative ambient 
standards.94 And states, which must implement the standards through 
elaborate plans and their own legal requirements, often take a keen 
interest in the national standards, particularly when their own locality 
is likely to be out of compliance with a proposed standard.95 
Thus, when the EPA embarks on its mandated, five-year review of 
each of the existing NAAQS, nearly everyone takes an interest. The 
fact that the issues are technical, the studies numerous, and the models 
and analyses inherently complicated does not insulate this particular 
expert rulemaking from diverse scrutiny and political controversy.96 
 
92. See, e.g., EPA, Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990–
2020, the Second Prospective Study (2011), available at https:// 
 www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act-1990-
2020-second-prospective-study [https://perma.cc/9SJY-4ZHS]. 
93. See, e.g., EPA, Summary of the Updated Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA) for the Reconsideration of the 2008 Ozone 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) S1–4 (2009) 
(indicating a range of between about $7.6 billion and $25 billion in costs 
annually between an ozone standard of 0.070 ppm versus 0.075 ppm), 
available at https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/s1-supplemental 
 _analysis_summary11-5-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWS4-L7XP]. 
94. See Overview of Air Pollution from Transportation, EPA, https://www 
 .epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/learn-about-air-
pollution-transportation [https://perma.cc/MBV4-AEKL] (last updated 
May 31, 2018). 
95. See William Boyd, The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards: A Case Study of Durability and Flexibility in Program Design 
and Implementation, in Lessons from the Clean Air Act 15 (Ann 
Carlson & Dallas Burtraw eds., 2019). 
96. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Obama Abandons a Stricter Limit on Air 
Pollution, N.Y. Times (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
 09/03/science/earth/03air.html [https://perma.cc/7HVR-GN4L] (describing 
President Obama’s decision to reject a more stringent ozone standard 
despite strong scientific evidence, including the Clean Air Science 
Advisory Committee’s (CASAC) endorsement in its favor); Clinton Oks 
Tough Clean Air Standards: Congress has Power to Overturn New Rules, 
Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 26, 1997, at A1 (describing President 
Clinton’s controversial decision to back the EPA’s more stringent ozone 
standard). Vice President Gore was even dubbed the “Ozone Man” by 
President George H.W. Bush during the campaign season due to Gore’s 
advocacy of strong air-quality rules. ‘Ozone Man’, Baltimore Sun (Oct. 
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During the first several decades of the NAAQS program, the EPA’s 
coping device for surviving this fierce scrutiny was to produce ever more 
encyclopedic background documents supporting its proposed revised 
standards. 97  Although not intentionally unwieldy, the EPA’s 
comprehensive review of the literature erred on the side of over-inclusive 
analysis precisely to protect against criticism. Yet, since Congress had 
also mandated that these periodic reassessments of each of the NAAQS 
occur once every five years, the EPA’s exhaustive approach fell well 
outside the timeline and the EPA was continuously operating in 
violation of court-ordered deadlines.98 
Caught between a rock and a hard place, the Agency revisited its 
approach for purely utilitarian reasons.99 It needed to devise a process 
that would improve its accountability—particularly to the public—
improve its record in court, and provide some insulation from attacks 
by the White House and other political officials. Thus, the NAAQS 
process was reinvented not so much to protect the agency's expertise, 
but to advance the pragmatic goal of enabling standards to be 
promulgated more expeditiously.100 And yet, conveniently, as it turns 
out, in order to survive the firestorm coming at it from all sides, the 
Agency also found it had no choice but to elevate excellence in expertise 
above all else. Even political officials appreciated that the only way 
through the adversarial obstacle course of legal and political 
controversy was to develop these rulemakings using an impeccable, 
science-styled process.101 
The revised NAAQS process now showcases a number of 
innovations in structuring expert bureaucratic processes. None of these 
features is perfect, and few stakeholders will be happy with every aspect 
of them. As a conceptual matter, however, the innovations make great 
strides over the status quo described in Part I. The most noteworthy 
best practices include: 
1. Incremental Technical Assessments and Reports that 
Inform (but Do Not Determine) the Regulatory 
Standard. The first, and perhaps most, important element 




97. NAAQS Process Review Workgroup, Review of the Process for 
Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards 3–5 (2006), 
available at https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/pdfs/naaqs_process_report_ 
 march2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SSJ-6XBN]. 
98. Id. at E-1, 5. 
99. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 30. 
100. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.  
101. See Wagner, supra note 44, at 193. 
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incremental, technical reports102 authored and edited by the 
EPA’s scientific staff.103 This expert analytical work begins 
after an initial public “scoping” session, which frames the 
relevant questions for the experts. Political officials, 
stakeholders, the public, and others all take part in this 
scoping exercise.104 Based on input from the full range of 
interested participants, including political officials, the EPA’s 
staff then prepares a final “scoping report” which sets out the 
written charges that guide the subsequent technical 
analyses.105 This scoping report is also published for notice 
and comment. 
After the scoping report is finalized, the EPA’s technical 
staff produce a series of reports that explore and analyze how 
the existing literature informs these policy-framed 
questions.106 The first of these reports provides a review of 
the relevant scientific literature bearing on the questions.107 
The second report integrates that literature into alternative 
models.108 The final technical report presents all the previous 
findings in a way that policymakers can understand, 
including explicating the unknowns and uncertainties. 109 
Only after the technical documents are completed does the 
Agency convene an inter-agency team (including lawyers and 
political officials) to write the proposed rule that is informed, 
but not determined by this analytical work.110 
2. Firewalls. To ensure these preliminary technical reports are 
as rigorous as possible, they are written by scientific staff who 
are “firewalled” from political officials.111 While political staff 
can converse with the technical units, they are expected to 
do so on the record in ways that are subject to FOIA.112 
Although this firewall is not a written procedural 
requirement, the scientific staff at the EPA insist that it 
 
102. Wagner, supra note 8, at 32–34. 
103. Id. at 39–40. 
104. Id. at 32. 
105. Id.  
106. Id. at 33–34. 
107. This is called the “integrated scientific assessment report.” Id. at 33. 
108. This is called the “risk/exposure assessment report.” Id. at 33–34. 
109. This is called the “policy assessment report.” Id. at 34. 
110. Id. at 35. 
111. See id. at 36. 
112. Id.  
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operates like an established norm that insulates their work.113 
It provides benefits not only in separating the technical 
assessment from political control, but also heightening the 
transparency of the expert deliberations in ways that 
deliberative process protections might otherwise obscure.114 
3. Attribution. To provide incentives for excellence in analysis 
and even peer review, all scientific authors of each report, as 
well as individual peer reviewers, are given attribution.115 
Agency staffers who help prepare a chapter or review a 
section are identified by name. 116  These staff members’ 
professional reputations are thus tied to the quality of the 
draft or final version of the document. 117  The scientific 
journals underscore the vital role that disclosures of 
attribution and authorship play in enhancing scientific 
integrity.118 In its NAAQS program, the EPA borrows these 
conventions and introduces them into its own process to both 
enhance scientific accountability and to provide reputation-
based incentives for the EPA's scientific staff. 
4. Rigorous Peer Review. Each of the reports in the series 
are subjected to internal peer review—and sometimes 
external review by individual experts119—and the reports are 
then reviewed by the Clean Air Science Advisory Committee 
(CASAC), a scientific peer-review committee established by 
statute. 120  The Clean Air Act explicitly identifies the 
disciplines of each member of the CASAC,121 although, as 
discussed earlier, there is political discretion in the actual 
selection of scientists that has sometimes been abused.122 But 
 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 116. 
115. Id. at 36, 52–53. 
116. Id.  
117. Id. 
118. See, e.g., Defining the Role of Authors and Contributors, Int’l Committee 
of Med. J. Editors, http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/ 
 roles-and-responsibilities/defining-the-role-of-authors-and-contributors.html# 
 :~:text= [https://perma.cc/E8BZ-N7YG] (“Authorship confers credit and 
has important academic, social, and financial implications.”) (last visited 
June 7, 2020). 
119. Wagner, supra note 8, at 33–34.  
120. Id. at 30, 33–34. 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
122. See, e.g., Sean Reilly, Documents Expose Ties Among EPA Panel’s 
Experts, E&E News (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/ 
 1062289617 [https://perma.cc/VX4L-X8MW]. 
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generally, over the last four decades, the CASAC has been 
comprised of the nation’s top outside experts and it rigorously 
scrutinizes each of the EPA’s technical reports.123 It is not 
atypical for the CASAC to go through two rounds of peer 
review for each report, with each round of comments running 
dozens of pages.124 In revising the report based on this peer 
review, the EPA traditionally explains in considerable detail 
how it responded to each of the CASAC’s comments.125 And 
the CASAC gets a final opportunity for response after each 
of the EPA’s draft reports is revised.126 In this way, the 
quality of the Agency’s technical analyses is improved by 
deploying multiple, intensive mechanisms for scientific peer 
review. All of this peer review is publicly available.127 While 
there is still considerable room for improvement in 
institutionalizing this external scientific peer review—
particularly with respect to selecting high quality scientists 
to serve as reviewers and ensuring they understand their 
limited role 128 —this step in the process marks the 
fundamental importance of diverse, expert peer review of 
agency technical analyses. 
5. Continuous Public Review. A draft of each of the three 
technical reports, as well as the scoping report, is also subject 
to notice and comment by the public.129 The White House 
and other agencies can offer their comments as well, but their 
input goes on the record.130 If the White House is concerned 
about undisclosed discretionary judgments buried in the 
 
123. See, e.g., EPA, Safeguarding the Future: Credible Science, 
Credible Decisions 38 (1992) (noting the positive effect of CASAC on 
EPA’s decisions); Mark R. Powell, Science at EPA: Information 
in the Regulatory Process 43 (1999) (reporting on how persons 
interviewed for the study on science at the EPA “gave SAB and CASAC 
credit for improving EPA’s acquisition and use of science”). 
124. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 8, at 34. 
125. Id. at 38. 
126. Id. at 34; see also id. at 127 (discussing role of CASAC in declaring closure 
on technical disputes). 
127. See id. at 113–15. 
128. See, e.g., Dudley & Peacock, supra note 83, at 82, 83 (arguing that 
CASAC in particular would benefit from clearer instructions about the 
scope of their review responsibilities).  
129. Wagner, supra note 8, at 37, 38. 
130. Id. at 35. 
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analysis or technical lapses of judgment, for example, the 
political officials are free to raise these concerns.131  
As noted at the outset, these technical reports prepared by scientific 
staff during the NAAQS process do not endeavor to select a proposed 
air-quality standard; they simply provide a consensus-based summary 
of the relevant scientific literature that responds to policy-based 
questions regarding the state of the relevant science. 
The selection of a proposed (and, ultimately, final) standard begins 
only after the technical reports are completed. These subsequent 
rulemaking deliberations are interdisciplinary, they can be quite 
political, and they often involve other agencies and White House 
offices.132 Ultimately, if the EPA’s Administrator decides to ignore the 
technical report’s findings and selects a standard outside the “plausible” 
range identified in these reports, it is his or her prerogative to do so.133 
But, unlike many other agencies’ science-intensive programs, the EPA’s 
NAAQS process is unique because it has made public the underlying, 
separate expert analysis.134 Thus, political officials cannot hide their 
decisions to deviate from scientific recommendations by altering the 
terms of the technical analysis itself and claiming that the “science 
made me do it.” 
It is also important to point out that the innovations just described 
are not the brainchild of a political official, but came from a team of 
the EPA’s scientific staff charged with reconfiguring the NAAQS 
process (under George W. Bush’s administration). 135  Faced with a 
mandate to design a better-working, more expedient process for 
integrating scientific information into policy, 136  the EPA’s staff 
developed this revised NAAQS process. These high-level career staffers 
were presumably aware that the Agency’s reputation, as well as their 
 
131. Dudley and Peacock take issue with some of the technical assumptions 
that are endemic in the technical reports, like assuming causation for 
correlations in epidemiological studies or adopting a default, linear-dose 
response curve when the data is limited. Dudley & Peacock, supra note 
83, at 63, 64. These are precisely the kinds of issues and sources of 
disagreements that could (and likely are) raised in notice and comment 
on each of the technical reports. Indeed, if there are plausible alternative 
assumptions not disclosed by the staff in the technical report that make 
a material difference to the recommendations, this lapse would be a valid 
reason for a political appointee or interagency team to give less weight to 
the technical report in their decision-making. 
132. Id. at 74. 
133. Id.  
134. Wagner, supra note 8, at 34. 
135. See, e.g., NAAQS Process Review Workgroup, supra note 97, at 2, 
3.  
136. Id. at 1. 
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own professional reputations, turn on the quality of their expertise.137 
Political pressure on the Agency from diverse stakeholders only serves 
to further elevate these staff incentives for excellence, since the 
Agency’s technical work will be flyspecked by diverse critics. In some 
settings, excellence in expertise may thus become a survival tool for an 
agency. 
III. The Path to More Consistent Bureaucratic 
Expertise 
There are several lessons about agency expertise to be drawn from 
the EPA’s NAAQS process. First, and perhaps most significant, the 
procedural innovations underscore how expert agencies can sometimes 
manage to persevere and strengthen the integrity of their scientific 
contributions despite, and not because of, poorly designed legal 
requirements. They also provide a testament to the high hopes for civic 
bureaucracies and what they can accomplish.138 
Moreover, in the NAAQS program, the Agency’s success in bringing 
rigorous scientific expertise to bear—in a way that stands up to 
academic scientific peer review, public comment, and judicial review—
is attributable in large part to its career scientific staff.139 Although 
studies of the role of the civil service in bureaucracies are rare, what we 
do know is that under the right conditions, agency staff can behave in 
ways that are professional and rise above personal ideologies.140 There 
is thus reason to be optimistic that, when the bureaucratic structure is 
constructed properly (both in terms of staff incentives and minimizing 
external constraints), agencies can bring the very best science to their 
decision making.  
Second, it follows that if we want excellent agency experts, we may 
need to look no further than some of the programs and staff already in 
 
137. This was a consistent theme in all of my interviews with the EPA staff. 
See generally Wagner, supra note 8. See also Daniel Carpenter, 
Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical 
Regulation at the FDA 299–300 (2010). 
138. See, e.g., B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, Bureaucratic 
Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy 126 (1994) 
(“It is healthy for bureaucracy to use its information advantages to better 
inform principals on either policy matters or the nature of the 
bureaucratic process . . . .”); Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory 
State, 27 J.L. & Soc’y 38, 55 (2000) (touting the importance of checks 
and balances in which “opposed maximizers” hold one another in check). 
139. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
140. See, e.g., John Brehm and Scott Gates, Working, Shirking, and 
Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public 79–81 
(1999); Marissa Martino Golden, What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and 
Administration During the Reagan Years 106–07 (2000). 
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place. Rather than reinvent the wheel through executive or legislative 
action, we should focus initially on locating models of agency expertise 
emerging organically from within the EPA and other agencies. 141 
Indeed, since these programs are not designed with a clear political end 
in mind, they provide a more reliable template for incorporating 
scientific expertise into an agency’s decisions than those designed by 
members of Congress or the White House.142 Providing agencies like the 
EPA with autonomy in determining how best to provide expert advice, 
coupled with proper high-level incentives to be excellent, may be all 
that is needed to nurture agency expertise. 
Finally, these high hopes for stronger expert agencies come with a 
distinct and critical catch. The success story of the NAAQS may have 
come about in part because of the unique circumstances of EPA's 
regulatory environment. In the NAAQS program, EPA operates under 
intensive political and stakeholder pressures that put great weight on 
scientific evidence. Every move the Agency makes in its decision process 
is put under scrutiny. In settings where this kind of adversarial pressure 
cannot be brought to bear, agency processes may need to be designed 
to follow and enforce this process without relying on stakeholder 
oversight. 143  Indeed, such an expert-based process will need to 
anticipate and withstand the frequent one-sided stakeholder pressures 
and accompanying interventions by the political branch that seek to 
knock the expert analysis off course. This type of structured expert 
process may also need to be more explicit within an agency program, 
operating as written “internal law” that guides agency actions across 
rulemakings.144 Without a process that nurtures and protects scientific 
expertise, existing procedural requirements may operate in some 
settings to undermine the integrity of expert advice. 
Conclusion 
Any fiftieth birthday should involve some celebration of a half-
century of accomplishments, and the EPA’s birthday is no exception. 
The EPA has managed to not only provide excellent expert advice for 
 
141. The NAAQS process is not the only program where some of these 
innovations occur, and EPA is not the only agency doing innovative work 
to nurture and enhance its ability to provide expertise. See, e.g., 
Wagner, supra note 8, at 108–10. 
142. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner et al., Whose Science? A New Era in Regulatory 
Science Wars, 362 Science 636, 636–39 (2018) (tracing the political 
motives lying behind some regulatory reform initiatives). 
143. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 44, at 193–203 (considering reforms for these 
lopsided stakeholder rulemaking environments). 
144. See, e.g., McGarity & Wagner, supra note 10, at 1792–1800 (proposing 
analogous reform and explaining why it may need to be legislatively 
codified, at least in part); Reilly-Diakun, supra note 21, at 220–29. 
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one of its most important regulatory programs, but in doing so, it has 
developed a blueprint that could serve as a model for other programs 
within the EPA, in other federal agencies, and for expert bodies across 
the globe. It is now up to the rest of us to follow the Agency’s lead. 
